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Abstract 
This research offers a theoretical model of brokered services and provides an analysis of their impact 
on the cloud computing market with risk preference-based stratification of client segments. The model 
structures the decision problem that clients face when they choose among spot, reserved and brokered 
services. Although all the three types of services do not indemnify the cloud services client against 
other kinds of service outages, due to changes in market demand, service interruptions occur most 
frequently in the spot market, and are lower when brokered services are offered, and no risk of inter-
ruption is involved in reserved services. Based on our analysis, we show that the profitability and sus-
tainability of a cloud service broker depends on its usage of reserved resources and its capability to 
mitigate the risk of interruptions. We further enrich our explanation through the consideration of the 
distribution of clients’ risk preferences and the service vendor’s pricing decisions for reserved and 
spot services.  
Keywords: Cloud Computing, Cloud Service Brokerage, Economic Analysis, IT Services, Risk, Re-
served Services, Spot Services. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 INTRODUCTION  
Cloud service brokerages have emerged as digital intermediaries in the information technology (IT) 
services market, creating value for cloud computing clients and vendors alike. According to Gartner 
(2012), which forecasts that annual IT spending on cloud service brokerages will reach $100 billion 
by 2014, cloud service brokerages derive value from the cloud resource management and brokerage 
services in different ways. One way is through customization of services, so adopting these services 
will be less risky for clients. Cloud computing services can be tweaked to meet the needs of clients in 
ways that are value-enhancing for the clients and are, at the same time, economical and profitable for 
the vendor. Another way for a cloud service broker to provide value is through the aggregation or 
bundling of services. Cloud computing services have become less expensive due to the development 
of connections between multiple kinds of cloud services, and new technological and managerial ap-
proaches to leverage their applications in the market. Aggregation also beneficially decreases the 
search costs that potential clients experience, since there is a possibility of one-stop shopping for 
cloud computing services. Furthermore, there is likely a broker brand effect, which will diminish the 
uncertainty discount that clients ascribe to the services of vendors they do not know. In this sense, the 
cloud service broker can act as an infomediary and guarantor of the quality of pre-qualified vendors’ 
service.  
Earlier research characterizes the main functions of service brokerages as intermediating transactions, 
and bundling services and products (Bakos et al. 2005). In the context of clouding computing, we are 
motivated by the market potential of cloud service brokerages and seek to provide theoretical insights 
into their impact by addressing the following question: How do brokered cloud computing services 
affect the cloud computing market? We use risk preference–the amount of risk the client wishes to 
take–as a key variable to analyze a client’s decision-making process related to her service choice from 
among reserved, spot, and brokered cloud services.  
In the section that follows, we describe existing services in current cloud computing market. We then 
develop a cost model that incorporates risk measures from financial economics, and derives critical 
values for a client’s risk preference related to threshold values for client segments in the market. We 
also show the impact of brokered cloud services related to cloud service market shares and the gains 
that service vendors can make. We further demonstrate how the broker’s price premium is affected by 
its use of reserved resources, its capacity to manage risk, the distribution of client risk preference, and 
the vendor’s decision about pricing its services. We also will discuss how a cloud service broker’s 
position in the market can be sustained. 
2 CLOUD COMPUTING SERVICES  
There are two types of cloud services offered by existing cloud vendors, and they are resources for 
cloud service brokers to leverage with. Cloud computing services with reserved resources are pre-
committed resources for clients by the vendor (we will refer to this type of resources as reserved re-
sources). Reserved resources, priced based on either a subscription or pay-per-use, perform in a way 
that once a client launches a job, the vendor will set aside capacity for the job until the client termi-
nates it.  
The resource acquisition and allocation of cloud computing services with resources priced by the spot 
market (we will refer to this type of resources as spot resources) differ from reserved resources. Spot 
resources have no commitment on the part of the vendor to guarantee access at a given time, other 
than via the client’s willingness to pay the spot market price for services. The acquisition of resources 
for spot services varies according to a client’s bid price and the changing relationship between supply 
and demand. Clients submit bids representing the maximum unit prices they are willing to pay for a 
predefined type of spot service. As soon as the service price in the spot market goes above the client's 
bid price, the vendor will terminate the service for that client. Clients, as a result, will receive service 
allocations that are affected by the interplay between supply and demand.  
Computing jobs running on spot resources may occasionally be interrupted due to price spikes in the 
 market. Most of the time, though, spot service prices are below one quarter of all the jobs which use 
reserved resources. Significant cost savings from using spot resources are attractive for clients who 
need cloud computing services for compute-intensive jobs. This has led to the design and application 
of a variety of resource allocation approaches, involving predictive analytics, machine learning, and 
other models that support value-conscious use of limited server resources (Das et al. 2011; Mazzuco 
and Dumas 2011). Empowered by those resource management techniques, cloud service brokers are 
able to provide less costly and more reliable services to clients (Elliott 2012).  
3 MODEL 
To start with a sufficient simplicity that has a reasonable representation of the real world market, we 
model a cloud computing market with a monopoly vendor, a service broker, and a pool of clients.   
3.1 The Vendor and Broker of Cloud Computing Services  
The vendor offers two types of cloud computing services: reserved and spot services. The reserved 
services are offered to clients with a guarantee of uninterrupted job execution at a fixed price. The 
spot services are offered to clients in an auction-like manner that may have unintentional termination 
under certain conditions. When a service interruption occurs to a job that was initiated based on the 
spot services, clients may need to use other form of computing resources. This can be their in-house 
computing resources or some other services to which they have a subscription. 
The cloud service broker offers cloud computing services based on spot and reserved resources made 
available by the monopoly vendor. It mitigates the risk of service interruption by dynamically sched-
uling clients’ jobs. The clients still bear some job interruption risk, though at a lower level than spot 
services. The ratio of reserved versus spot resources used by the broker is a and 1 – a respectively 
(see Table 1 for the details of our modeling notation). The cost of the broker’s service is a combina-
tion of the reserved resource and spot resource costs with similar proportions. The proportion of re-
served resources in the broker’s resource management model together with technology advance is 
what drives the interruption risk downwards.  
 
Variable Description 
JobCost, InterruptCost  Vendor cost for completing a job; unit cost of service interruption. 
TotalCost Total cost of executing a job, based on the job and interruption costs. 
RiskPref, (Δ) Client’s risk (difference in degree of risk) preference. 
SpotJobCost, 
(ReservedJobCost) Fixed cost for using spot (reserved) resources to execute a job. 
%ReservedResources Proportion of reserved cloud computing resources used by the service broker. 
BrokerJobCost Cost for using the service broker to execute a job, depending on a. 
#Interrupts,  Mean#Interrupts, 
SD#Interrupts 
Number (mean, standard deviation) of interruptions for the spot services 
market. 
MeanInterruptRisk (.),  
SDInterruptRisk (.) 
Risk-mapping for mean (standard deviation) of interruptions in broker’s 
services. 
F(.) Cumulative distribution function for risk preference of client population. 
Revenue, PricePremium, 
MktShare 
Stakeholder’s revenue, price premium, and market share of services 
consumed. 
A The broker’s percentage of use of reserved cloud computing resources. 
Δ Shift in demand from one cloud computing service to another different service. 
Table 1.  Modeling notation 
3.2 The Clients of Cloud Computing Services  
The clients in this market use spot resources to save money when the spot market price is low, but 
 they face the possibility of a service interruption during the job execution period. We assume a client 
population of unit mass, with computing jobs that involve parallel execution. We assume that clients 
will incur a constant additional cost when a service interruption occurs.  
3.3 The Mean-Risk Measure and the Total Cost Function  
We first consider a base case. We assume clients have identical computing jobs and their objective is 
to maximize the net gains from executing them. The net gains will be the same for clients irrespective 
of which of the three alternatives that they use, however, they will experience different total costs. 
To address the effects of client uncertainty when job interruptions are possible, we employ a mean-
risk measure to assess the interruption risk and the extent to which risk preference drives a client’s 
decision (Mookerjee 2000; Wang et al. 2008). It is a straightforward approach to communicate to in-
vestment management clients the risk associated with the price volatility of financial investments. Re-
searchers have adopted this measure in studies of IT investment and risk management in IS research 
(Paleologo 2004; Kauffman and Sougstad 2008). Such measures incorporate the mean and variance of 
the risk factor that affects the outcome of interest. Variance acts as a proxy for risk that captures the 
extent of the volatility and predisposition to change of a value-relevant factor in the firm's market or 
operating environment. In our setting, the mean-risk measure quantifies the effects of risky factors on 
cloud computing service choice. This enables comparative statics analysis for the various factors. 
Clients may perceive the financial impacts of service interruptions to be different, leading them to 
make different choices among the services (spot, reserved, brokered). Clients who perceive there to be 
too high a frequency of service interruption for spot services may shift to brokered services, if the 
broker’s services have fewer interruptions at an appropriate price. We capture the client's risk attitude 
toward uncertainty about financial losses with the variable RiskPref.  
Based on the mean-risk measure, the total cost of job execution is:  
    TotalCost = JobCost + InterruptCost · [Mean#Interrupts + (RiskPref · SD#Interrupts)]  
The second term in the right-hand side of the equation is the mean-risk measure, which captures the 
impact of the variance associated with service interruption on the total job cost.  
3.4 Modeling Assumptions 
We set the following assumptions for this model. 
• Assumption 1 (Risk-Neutral Clients). A risk-neutral client, represented by RiskPref = 0, is in-
different about variations in performance metrics such as total cost or utility. 
This rationale of this assumption is consistent with prior research (Mookerjee and Mannino 2000). 
Risk-neutral clients tend to find spot services to be more attractive and economical compared to re-
served services. This suggests that risk-neutral clients will also view the total cost of reserved services 
to be high compared to the total cost of spot services, i.e., TotalCostReserved > TotalCostSpot. Here, To-
talCostReserved = JobCostReserved, and TotalCostSpot = JobCostSpot + InterruptCost · Mean#Interruptsspot. 
We represent this information with the following constraint: JobCostReserved – JobCostSpot > Interrupt-
Cost · Mean#Interruptsspot.  
• Assumption 2 (Mean and Standard Deviation of Service Interruption Risk in Broker’s Ser-
vices). MeanInterruptRisk(0) = SDInterruptRisk(0) = 1, and MeanInterruptRisk(1) = SDInterrup-
tRisk(1) = 0.  
This assumption reflects the structure that, when the broker uses only spot resources to build its own 
service without stable computing resources as backup, it will bear the same level of interruption risk 
as if it were operated as a spot service vendor. When the broker’s service is based only on reserved 
resources though, there is no risk of service interruption.  
 4 ANALYSIS 
We next derive the critical values for the client’s risk preference in relation to her choice to use spot, 
reserved or brokered services. To accomplish this, we solve the set of TotalCost equations for differ-
ent client service choices when the difference between the total costs for each of the services is zero. 
Then, based on risk preference-based stratification of the client segments, we analyze how brokered 
services will affect the vendor's total revenue and the condition for brokered services to be sustainable. 
4.1 The Cloud Computing Services Market without Brokered Services 
The solution for the value of RiskPref consistent with values of TotalCost for spot and reserved ser-
vices is:  
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡,𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 = 𝐽𝑜𝑏𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 − 𝐽𝑜𝑏𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑆𝐷#𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑠𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡  ·  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛#𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑠𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑆𝐷#𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑠𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡  
Clients with a level of risk preference lower than RiskPrefSpot, Reserved will choose to use spot services, 
while the others will select reserved services.  
With this critical value for risk preference, we can derive the market shares for each of the service 
types and the vendor’s revenue from the market. The market share for reserved services is given by 
MktShareReserved = 1 - F(RiskPrefSpot, Reserved), and for spot services it is MktShareSpot = F(RiskPrefSpot, 
Reserved). Hence, the existing service vendor’s total revenue will be RevenueVendor = JobCostReserved · (1 - 
F(RiskPrefSpot, Reserved)) + JobCostSpot · F(RiskPrefSpot, Reserved).  
4.2 The Cloud Computing Services Market with Brokered Services 
Using a similar analysis approach, we next derive a decision rule for the client to choose one of the 
three services. We solve for other critical values of RiskPref by comparing TotalCost for spot versus 
brokered services, and reserved versus brokered services. We already have derived a similar value for 
spot versus reserved services, which will be useful for this analysis. 
First, we calculate the total cost for clients when they use the brokered services. The cloud service 
broker has room to make profit with the capability to provide services with a very small probability of 
service interruption, while utilizing more spot resources and less reserved resources that can keep 
their average cost close to the average cost of spot services. The broker can charge a price that is 
higher than the spot price but is lower than the reserved service price to gain a price premium. In our 
model, we call this the broker’s PricePremium. Thus, we have 
     Mean#InterruptsBroker = MeanInterruptRisk(a) ·Mean#InterruptsSpot                                            (1) 
     SD#InterruptsBroker = SDInterruptRisk (a) · SD#InterruptsSpot                                                       (2) 
    JobCostBroker = (1 + PricePremium) · (a · JobCostReserved +(1 - a) · JobCostSpot)                            (3) 
With the JobCostBroker, Mean#InterruptsBroker and SD#InterruptsBroker variables, we can compute the 
client’s risk preference for brokered versus reserved services, and for spot versus brokered services, as 
follows: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟,   𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 = 𝐽𝑜𝑏𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 − 𝐽𝑜𝑏𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑆𝐷#𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑠𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟  · 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛#𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑠𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑆𝐷#𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑠𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟  
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡,𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟= 𝐽𝑜𝑏𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟 − 𝐽𝑜𝑏𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡
�𝑆𝐷#𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑠𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡 − 𝑆𝐷#𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑠𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟� · 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
−
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛#𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑠𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡 − 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛#𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑠𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟
𝑆𝐷#𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑠𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡 − 𝑆𝐷#𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑠𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟  
Existing cloud service vendor’s revenue. With the results we have established, we can construct the 
equation for the service vendor’s revenue when the broker enters the market, RevenueVendor’, as fol-
 lows:  
    RevenueVendor’ = JobCostReserved  
       · (1 - F(RiskPrefBroker, Reserved)  + a · (F(RiskPrefBroker, Reserved) - F(RiskPrefSpot, Broker)))  
       + JobCostSpot · (Frisk(RiskPrefSpot, Broker) + (1 - a) · (F(RiskPrefBroker, Reserved) - F(RiskPrefSpot, Broker)))  
We next consider the change in revenue that occurs for the vendor when the broker enters the market, 
as follows:  
   ΔRevenue = JobCostReserved · (F(RiskPrefSpot, Reserved)  
         - (1 - a) · F(RiskPrefBroker, Reserved) - a · F(RiskPrefSpot, Broker))  
         + JobCostSpot · (a · F(RiskPrefSpot, Broker)  
         + (1 - a) · F(RiskPrefBroker, Reserved) - F(RiskPrefSpot, Reserved)) 
Based on this analysis approach, not all clients will be willing to choose brokered services. This is 
because the broker's price premium, consistent with the client's value, may exceed the reduction in 
TotalCost due to the decrease in perceived risk for the brokered services. 
The broker’s profit and its constraints. In the market in which spot and reserved services are of-
fered, clients with risk preference higher than RiskPrefSpot, Reserved will purchase the reserved service 
and the rest will use the spot service. When the broker enters the cloud market, a portion of the clients 
who utilize spot and reserved services will shift to the brokered services. Clients with risk preference 
higher than RiskPrefSpot, Broker and lower than RiskPrefBroker, Reserved will adopt the brokered service. The 
shift in demand from reserved to brokered services is represented by δReserved, Broker =RiskPrefBroker, Re-
served - RiskPrefSpot, Reserved. And the shift in demand from spot services to brokered service is repre-
sented by δSpot, Broker  = RiskPrefSpot, Reserved  - RiskPrefSpot, Broker.  
For brokered services to be feasible, two conditions must be satisfied to guarantee that the market 
shares for each of the three types of services are positive, that is, δReserved, Broker >0 and δSpot, Broker > 0. 
Although we cannot see it directly by visually assessing the mathematical forms of the critical value 
functions for RiskPref, it can be shown that the former condition will dominate the latter one. This is 
true in the sense that, if the first condition is satisfied then the second one will automatically be satis-
fied. This leads to the following condition for the brokered services: 
     (JobCostReserved - JobCostBroker) · SD#InterruptsBroker - (JobCostReserved - JobCostSpot)  
        · SD#InterruptsBroker - Mean#InterruptsBroker · InterruptCost · SD#InterruptsSpot 
        + Mean#InterruptsSpot · InterruptCost · SD#InterruptsBroker > 0                                                  (4) 
4.3 The Brokered Services Feasibility Condition 
By combining Equations 1, 2, 3 and 4, we obtain the following proposition:  
• Proposition (Brokered Services Feasibility Condition). A feasibility condition for the brokered 
services is: 
 JobCostReserved · (1 - a - a · PricePremium - SDInterruptRisk(a)) + JobCostSpot  
   · (a + a · PricePremium + SDInterruptRisk(a) - 1 - PricePremium) + InterruptCost   (5) 
   · Mean#InterruptsSpot · (SDInterruptRisk(a) - MeanInterruptRisk (a)) > 0 
This condition will be satisfied regardless of the scale of JobCostReserved and JobCostSpot when  
SDInterruptRisk(a) > MeanInterruptRisk(a) and PricePremium = 0. Because the left-hand side of 
Equation 5 is decreasing in the broker’s PricePremium, we can derive an upper bound for the Price-
Premium when the Brokered Services Feasibility Condition holds, and is denoted by 
UB[PricePremium]: 
     [(JobCostReserved - JobCostSpot) · (1 - a - SDInterruptRisk(a)) + InterruptCost ·Mean#InterruptsSpot  
         · (SDInterruptRisk(a) - MeanInterruptRisk(a))] / [JobCostReserved · a + SpotMktJobCost · (1 - a)] 
To be sustainable, while cloud service brokers benefit clients with lower-risk and lower-cost services, 
brokered services should also benefit the existing cloud services vendor by increasing the vendor’s 
revenue. Otherwise, the vendor will stop offering its resources to the broker. This requires another 
condition to be true. Because the broker’s service cost will incur to the clients who originally used 
reserved or spot services, to benefit the vendor, the broker’s service cost should be larger than what 
the vendor incurred to this group of clients prior to the entry of the broker. The differences in the 
critical values of RiskPref act as proxies for the broker’s market share. Based on additional mathe-
matical analysis involving the critical values for RiskPref for the different services, we can state the 
conditions under which brokered services will add value for the vendor: 
       a > 𝐹(𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟,𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑) − 𝐹(𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡,𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑)
𝐹(𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟,𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑) − 𝐹(𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡,𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟)   
With these constraints that ensure brokered services are feasible and sustainable, we now can formal-
ize the broker’s decision problem as: 
      Max(a, PricePremium)  PricePremium · [ a · JobCostReserved + (1 - a) · JobCostSpot] 
 
                                  · [F(RiskPrefBroker, Reserved) - F(RiskPrefSpot, Broker)] 
                subject to  𝑎 >  𝐹(𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟,𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑) – 𝐹(𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡,𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑)
𝐹(𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟,𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑) – 𝐹(𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡,𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟)  
                                  PricePremium < UB[PricePremium] 
5 NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATION 
We provide an illustration based on the parameters in Table 2 to show the constraints to the brokered 
services due to the feasibility condition. The parameters satisfy the modeling assumptions introduced 
in Section 3.4, and the risk-mapping functions for the mean and standard deviation of broker’s job 
interruptions are the same. 
JobCostReserved 4 
JobCostSpot 1 
InterruptCost 1 
Mean#InterruptsSpot 1 
SD#InterruptsSpot    0.5 
Table 2.  Parameter settings for illustrative numerical analysis of brokered services 
We assume a uniform distribution for clients’ risk references, and thus constrain a is simplified as to 
be greater than 1−𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘(𝑎)
𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘(𝑎) . We also constraint the broker’s price premium to the upper 
bound UB[PricePremium]. We randomly generate 100 combinations of values of percentage of re-
served resource usage and risk mapping function that satisfy constraints, and use the values to calcu-
late the broker’s profit and the vendor’s gain from brokered services. The results suggest that while 
reducing reserved resource usage and increasing its capability to mitigate interruption risk improve 
the broker’s profitability, such an approach decreases the vendor’s gain from the brokered service. 
Figure 1 illustrates the conflict of interest between the broker and the vendor. We rank the combina-
tions according to the broker’s profit, and the figure shows that the combinations that generate the 
maximum profit for the broker result in the lowest gain for the vendor. When we change the parame-
ter setting of JobCostReserved to 5 from 4, we can observe a shift-up of vendor’s gain associated with a 
shift-down of broker’s profit. This finding suggests that though new technological approaches may 
further enhance the broker’s capability of resource utilization and risk mitigation, to ensure brokered 
services sustainable, the broker needs to balance the benefits of and the vendor’s potential strategic 
responses to implementing the new techniques.   
  
Figure 1.  Broker’s profits and vendor’s gain at different combinations of percentage of re-
served resources usage and the risk-mapping function 
6 DISCUSSION 
This research-in-progress provides analytical insights into quantifying the feasibility conditions of 
brokered cloud services. The condition is constrained by the proportion of reserved services resources 
the broker uses, and the capability the broker possesses to mitigate the interruption risk the clients 
face. Therefore, it is a useful tool for a cloud service broker to assess its business feasibility based on 
the risk mitigation capability, vendor’s pricing, and client related parameters.  
The cloud brokers have a room to promote the use of cloud services by customizing them for cost and 
risk-conscious clients. This is similar to what financial institutions do that provide portfolio manage-
ment services. They attract investors who want to achieve some balance between investing with some 
risk, while achieving an attractive level of return. The brokers, however, must do nothing to harm the 
value that the vendors already create in the market, while doing new things the vendors are not capa-
ble of to increase revenue and welfare. Meanwhile, the clients should also be better off, and are will-
ing to pay for and engage the brokered services. This ties in with how client segments and market 
shares arise in the presence of different approaches to the provision of cloud services.  
There is space for us to extend the model. One approach is to analyze the interplay of the pricing 
strategies of the broker and the vendor. Our numerical illustration already showed the conflict of in-
terest between the broker and the vendor, and the impact of the vendor’s price change. We can extend 
the model to include the vendor’s strategic price changes of reserved and spot resources, and the bro-
ker’s change of price premium. Another approach is to look at market saturation. Current model as-
sumes a saturated market, and it results in the strict constraints for brokered services to be sustainable 
because the broker’s gain of market share will be at the provider’s loss. If there are previously unsatis-
fied demands, both brokers and vendors will benefit from market shares arise in the presence of bro-
kered cloud services.  
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